Originally published February 2, 2015 at 2:52 PM | Page modified February 2, 2015 at 5:46 PM
In terms of magnitude and reasonably expected outcomes, the interception in Super Bowl XLIX arguably was the single worst play in Seattle sports history. So it’s natural to want a lone culprit’s head on a stick. That way it’s tidy.
But not entirely illuminating.
For the record, I believe the ball should have gone to Marshawn Lynch, but Pete Carroll’s decision to pass isn’t as ludicrous as many insist. But it was just one of many factors that influenced the play.
A few thoughts on what went wrong:
• Burning timeouts: With 1:55 remaining, Russell Wilson chewed about 12 seconds off the clock while attempting to audible before aborting, then called Seattle’s first timeout. After Jermaine Kearse’s astonishing 33-yard catch, Seattle called its second timeout despite a dead-ball situation. After Marshawn Lynch advanced to the 1 on first down, the Seahawks used up 40 more seconds contemplating their options with just one timeout. That negated the option to run Lynch three more times. Down to 26 seconds, one of the remaining three plays had to be a pass. So the avoidable use of two administrative timeouts perhaps cost Seattle the championship.
• Pete Carroll’s decision to pass: On the first-down run by Lynch to the 1-yard line, Seattle played with regular “21” personnel, with two backs, one tight end and two receivers. The Patriots played base defense, with four defensive backs.
On second down, Seattle went with “zebra” or “11” personnel, with one back, one tight end and three receivers. The Patriots then countered with three defensive backs, four linebackers and four defensive linemen. Conventional wisdom is that Seattle had the advantage to throw, especially considering the Patriots almost exclusively play “cover zero” on the goal line — no safety help. Moreover, Lynch had scored just one touchdown in five runs from the 1-yard line this season. Carroll erred when saying that the pass play was a “waste” down, though I don’t believe he should be taken literally.
• Kearse’s “pick” on Malcolm Butler: Some teams call this play “slick” — a conjunction of “slant” and “pick.” Though jammed at the line by Brandon Browner, Kearse’s responsibility was to redirect Malcolm Butler to prevent a straight-line break on Ricardo Lockette’s slant route. To accomplish this, Kearse needed to release more to the inside, anticipating Butler’s path, rather than straight up field.
• Lockette’s pass route: With the ball on the left hash, the alignment of Kearse and the adjacent Lockette was neither wide nor tight. This “split” presented the threat of both out-breaking and vertical routes, so Lockette should have threatened both routes. Lockette’s steps were merely adequate — he was a little hasty — but his biggest error was with his head: He looked inward while his feet were faking vertical. Ideally his head would not turn inward until his outside shoulder turned inward. Butler eyed Lockette and the receiver’s technique keyed the undrafted rookie to drive on the slant route. Once inside, Lockette needed to accelerate his 6-foot-2, 211-pound frame and out-compete the 5-11, 190-pound Butler.
• Wilson’s decisions: Could Wilson have changed the play to a Lynch run? Not with the team’s current parameters. Once the pass was called only a heavy pass coverage would have induced an audible. As it was, New England was aligned in its customary goal-line, cover-zero defense, and Seattle had the optimal two-on-two matchup with Kearse and Lockette. The Patriots had no linebacker buzzing underneath the slant, no safety over the top, and not even a safety in the middle.
Any run-or-pass, check-at-the-line parameters would call for the quarterback to throw. Quarterbacks are taught that a ball to the back of the end zone generally should be thrown above the face mask, and a ball to the front of the end zone below the armpit. If Wilson thought he could beat Butler, then the ball should have been thrown lower and further behind Lockette, ideally on the “3” of Lockette’s No. 83 jersey.
But the play was on second down. In four-down territory. Wilson had to be sure, or else chuck it to the photographers.
Butler sold out on the slant route and would have been dead had Lockette faked in, then whipped out. Such a route would have been an easy touchdown. Though the play was quick, and quicker from the shotgun, the quarterback is the last analyst for the Seahawks. Coaches cannot anticipate all reactions by all defenders, particularly the sellout by Butler. The quarterback has to see it.
If the coach sends in a skunk, it’s the quarterback’s job to not let it stink.
• Game ball: Tom Brady in the fourth quarter was 13 of 15 passing for 124 yards and two touchdowns while erasing the only fourth-quarter, double-digit deficit in Super Bowl history. For 25 years I have thought Joe Montana is the greatest quarterback of all-time. I now believe it’s Brady.
Hugh Millen is a former NFL and Washington Huskies quarterback who writes analysis about the Seahawks this season for The Seattle Times.
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